This paper examines the relationship between teacher unionization, student achievement and teacher's pay using a cross-section of data from private schools in India. We use differences in student mark across subjects to identify within-pupil variation in achievement and find that union membership of the teacher appears to strongly reduce pupil achievement. We assess whether this could be due to the unobservables not controlled for by this procedure and find no evidence for this. A school fixed effects equation of teacher pay shows that union membership substantially raises pay and in this case too we find that remaining unobservables are unlikely to explain this outcome. We thus have in this data clear evidence that unions raise cost and reduce student achievement.
Introduction
Under different theoretical models, teacher unionization can lead to higher or lower student achievement. Conceptually there are two major reasons why teachers may become union members (Hoxby, 1996) . The first is that teachers maximise the same objective function as parents, namely student achievement, but have superior information about the correct input mixes. Union membership provide teachers with a collective voice to implement these input mixes. This may include for instance asking for lower class sizes or higher salaries which help to attract and retain superior teachers. The second potential reason for teachers joining a union is that they have a different objective function than parents or school management, possibly one in which school policies that directly affect them, such as teacher salaries, receive greater weight than policies that only indirectly affect them, i.e. membership of a rent-seeking teachers' union 1 .
A rent-seeking union may block reform of incentives to improve instruction, e.g. by tying salaries to seniority rather than to performance and by protecting ineffective teachers from dismissal.
Under rent seeking, unions may also lower achievement if their pursuit of higher salaries diverts resources away from other school inputs that raise achievement and if teacher union strikes disrupt teaching. Finally, since teachers interact with other inputs in order to produce education, rent seeking unions could lower the efficiency of the other inputs, such that more money for schools may not matter (Burtless, 2000; Lemke, 2004; Hoxby, 1996) .
The sign of the relationship between teacher union membership and student achievement is thus an empirical question. This paper addresses this empirical question asking how teacher unions affect student achievement and teacher's pay. We pose these questions with a unique dataset on private secondary schools from India which permits pupil fixed effects estimation of the achievement function, enabling us to address what are arguably the most important sources of endogeniety bias.
As has been widely recognised in the achievement production function literature imputing causality from any cross-section correlation between teacher attributes and student outcomes is problematic as students may match to schools and teachers endogenously. While randomized experiments provide a good solution to the problem of endogeneity in general (see Duflo and Hanna, 2005 , for one educational application in India), they cannot be used here since 1 Loveless (2000) , Ballou (2001) and Ballou and Podgursky (2000) argue that unions retard school reform. On the other hand, Henderson, Urban and Wolman (2004) argue that in recent times the public "has been exposed to a barrage of pejorative views" about teacher unions which "by and large condemn unions as obstacles to efficiency and quality" but do not recognise what unions have contributed towards building a quality public education system. Stone (2000) and Eberts (2007) summarize the US literature on the effect of teacher unions on student achievement.
teacher union membership cannot be randomly allocated. Although quasi-experimental approaches such as propensity score matching methods have been used to evaluate education program impacts (e.g. Machin and McNally, 2004) , they require the assumption that matching based on pre-treatment observables adequately captures all relevant characteristics of treated units. Valid instrumental variables are difficult to find and only few studies have convincingly tested impact effects in education using the IV approach (e.g. Angrist and Lavy,1999) . The IV approach is often infeasible in developing countries because even where official (exogenous)
rules, e.g. about maximum class-size or school start age etc., exist in law, they are rarely adhered to in practice. The panel data approach requires longitudinal data and this is scarce.
We examine the effect of teacher union membership on pupil learning using the standard cross-section achievement production function but allowing for pupil fixed effects. This is possible because the data used here provide each student's marks in five different subjects (English, second language, history/geography, math, science). We link the average characteristics of the teachers who teach that subject within the school to the achievement of the student. This approach allows us to control for all student and family unobservables and examine whether the union membership status of different subject teachers in a school is related to a student's marks across those subjects. In other words, we estimate a within-pupil across-subject equation of the achievement production function rather than a within-pupil across-time one. After investigating the union effect on pupil learning, we also examine the teacher pay schedule to ask whether unionized teachers are paid more once we control for their observable skills and the unobservable characteristics of the school.
2
While our approach can control for many possible sources of endogeneity, it cannot control for all. To see if the remaining unobservables could be explaining our results we adopt the procedure developed by Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) to assess how important these unobservables would need to be to explain our result. How important unobservables will be depends on what we can observe so in the next section we set out the data and model explicitly the potential role of unobservables in explaining our results. Section 3 presents estimates of how union membership affects achievement and section 4 the results for the effect of union membership on teacher pay. A final section concludes.
2 While much has been written on the effect of teacher unions on student achievement in the US, both by economists and non-economists (Eberts and Stone, 1987; Betts, 1996; Hoxby, 1996; Ballou and Podgursky, 2000; Lemke, 2004; Eberts, 2007; Loveless, 2000; Carini, 2002; Henderson, Urban and Wolman, 2004) , we are not aware of any research on this topic in developing countries in general and in India in particular.
Observables and Unobservables for Student Achievement
The data for this study come from a sample of 186 schools affiliated to the Council for Indian Secondary Certificate Examinations (CISCE) which is an English Medium exam board. The schools were chosen by a stratified random sampling procedure within 16 major Indian states (the strata). The sampling procedure is explained in Kingdon (2006 Examination results data were subsequently provided by the exam board and matched to students using a unique pupil identifier code. Students of grade 10 in the CISCE exam board have 5 compulsory and one optional subject. The optional subject is chosen from among a large number of subject choices and thus varies a great deal between students. We wish to use exam marks of students in the 5 compulsory subjects: English, Second language, History/Geography, Math and Science 3 . Table 1 shows mean mark by subject. Figure 1 shows Epanechnikov kernel densities of marks in different subjects. It is clear that the distribution of marks in different subjects differs appreciably. For instance, the distribution of the second-language mark is quite different to that of other subjects. In order to render the marks in the different subjects comparable, we standardize the mark in each subject by the national mean mark in the subject,
i.e. we use the z-score of achievement as our dependent variable. The z-score is a student's mark in a subject less the national mean mark in that subject, divided by the standard deviation of mark in the subject. Thus, by construction, mean z score in any given subject is 0 and its standard deviation is 1. Figure 2 shows the distribution of z-score for all subjects. Appendix Table 1 defines variables and shows descriptive statistics. The OLS regressions of standardized achievement by subject are presented in Appendix Table 2 , as an extension of the descriptive statistics, but we do not discuss these.
As a result of this data collection we have marks across subjects for the same student within a school as well as an extensive range of controls for both the student and the teacher. We have taken the average of characteristics of the subject teachers within a school so we have variation in these characteristics for a student across subjects. It is this cross-subject variation we intend to exploit in establishing if there is an effect from unions onto student achievement.
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μ , j ε and k η represent respectively the unobserved characteristics of the student, the school and the subject. The unobservables are in the error term, , and it is their potential correlation with the observables, in particular the union variable, that is the key to being able to identify a causal effect from unionization onto achievement. We proceed first by seeking to identify the Union effect separately from the other teacher characteristics which we treat as controls:
where jk TC is all teacher's characteristics that are independent of the unionization term, jk U . The teacher's characteristics that we are going to use in our achievement production function are: Equations (2) and (5) are our equations of interest and for both we need to allow for the possibility that there remain unobservables in the error terms correlated with the union variable.
Before considering this problem we outline how across-subject differencing has two important methodological advantages over across-time differencing.
Firstly, the across-subject approach does not suffer from the problem of non-random attrition of teachers and students over time that occurs in panel data. For instance, in their panel study relating student achievement to teacher characteristics using North Carolina data, Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2006) highlight the difficulty of determining whether a higher coefficient on teacher experience reflects improvement with experience or the differentially higher attrition of the less effective teachers 4 , and Rivkin et al (2005) also address non-random attrition 5 . Across-subject estimation obviates this problem since estimation is within pupil at one point in time.
While the potential for endogenous selection into the 'surviving' teachers' group is the same in both approaches, the across-time technique relies on change in teacher over time (over which non-random attrition can take place) as part of the estimation strategy, while the across-subject technique does not.
The second methodological advantage is that the across-subject approach provides a means to circumvent the potential problem of non-random matching of students to particular teachers within the school on the basis of their unobserved characteristics -whether it be brighter students matching to abler teachers or school policy deliberately matching slower students to abler teachers. Across-subject estimation bypasses the problem either by averaging the characteristics of all teachers by grade and subject within the school, or by restricting the sample to schools where any given subject is taught to the student's grade by only one teacher within the school. Either way, the student is by construction matched to a single set of teacher characteristics in each subject within the school.
It however remains the case that subject-varying school unobservables remain in the error term and may be correlated with the Union variable. Further it is required that teachers' unobserved characteristics be unrelated to the union variable. Since such omitted characteristics may be correlated both with Unionization status and with student achievement we cannot say that pupil fixed effects estimation of achievement -even with no subject-specific student and school unobserved heterogeneity -permits us to interpret the effects of Unionization as causal.
We propose to address this issue by borrowing from the procedures set out in Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) to assess the potential size of any bias due to the unobservables in the equation. In their paper they show that the notion that "selection on observables is the same as selection on unobservables" is equivalent to a condition that in our model (where we drop subscripts for clarity) is:
Cov v U Cov TC U Var v
Var TC γ γ = 5 According to Rivkin et al (2005, p429) , the effect of endogenous attrition is to cause upward bias in the coefficients of teacher characteristics. Suppose that high quality teachers are more likely to exit than low quality ones. In this case, schools that obtain a particularly good draw of teachers in one year will tend to have both a greater turnover at the end of the year and a larger average gain in pupil achievement than would be the case with random attrition. Similarly, in the more intuitive case where higher quality teachers are more likely to be retained. Thus, non-random attrition would upward bias estimates, irrespective of whether higher quality teachers are more likely to exit or remain.
The asymptotic bias from OLS is
orthogonal (tildes over a variable denote the residuals from a regression of that variable on X ).
We can estimate this bias by noting that:
where (8) follows from (7) using (6).
In reporting our regression results we will also show the results from applying this method. We do this by reporting the estimate of bias from equation (8). As we will show, for the school and student fixed effects regressions, the sign of the union effect is negative while the estimate of the potential bias induced by a correlation between the unobservables and the Union variable is positive. In this case the evidence points to the school and student fixed effects estimates of the union membership effect as being underestimates of the true negative impact.
Where the sign of the effect and the bias are of the same sign we report their ratio as this is open to the interpretation from Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) that it measures the size of the shift in the distribution of the unobservables necessary to explain away the implied effect from the Union treatment. We turn now to assessing the role of both observables and unobservables in determining student achievement.
The Achievement Production Function
The main result of the paper for student achievement is presented in Table 2 , which pools all five subjects. In the top panel the only teacher characteristic included is teacher union membership, in the bottom panel we include those teacher covariates in the vector set out above. The first column is an OLS achievement production function with state dummy variables. The second and third columns show school and pupil fixed effects results. The school fixed effects equation includes the full set of pupil characteristics, including a measure of pupil ability (as measured by the ravens progressive matrices test). The achievement production function changes dramatically when moving from the OLS to the within school analysis of Column (2). Exploiting within pupil variation in Column (3) does not change the union effect significantly.
jk TC
In the top panel of Table 2 , the coefficient on the union membership variable changes sign from positive to negative as we move from OLS to within-school analysis. While higher scoring schools are more likely to have unionized teachers, within a school the students of unionized teachers have sharply lower achievement levels. The bottom panel which includes the teacher covariates from shows a larger negative effect of unionization on achievement. These teacher characteristics do have a highly significant effect on student achievement and are positively correlated with the Union variable. Thus controlling for these observable aspects of the teacher is to increase the adverse effect of unionization on achievement. These results suggest that the achievement of a student in a subject that is taught by a unionized teacher is 0.23 standard deviations lower than his/her achievement in a subject taught by a non-unionized teacher. Having a unionized teacher appears inimical to student achievement.
TC
The results from the procedures of Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) are shown in the bottom part of the Table. There is evidence of a potentially substantial bias in the OLS results.
However once we move to the school and student fixed effects results, we find evidence of a positive correlation between the unobservables in the achievement equation and the Union variable, implying that the negative effect of Unionization on achievement is underestimated. (4)), which may be at least in part determined by the union status of the teacher. The inclusion of these variables does not affect the coefficient on union membership much. Table 4 shows various other robustness tests on the union membership effect. Though the magnitude of the coefficient on the union membership variable varies by sub-sample, it is negative and statistically significant in virtually all sub-samples, defined by student's gender, religion, wealth and ability, and by the subject-combination used for differencing. Unions reduce achievement across the whole range of student ability (lowest quartile, middle 50% and the top quartile of achievers), though the coefficient much smaller for low achievers than for middle and high achievers. This contrasts with syntheses of the US literature which find that unions modestly improve the achievement level of students who are middle-range performers but reduce that of students who are low and high performers (Eberts, 2007; Stone, 2000; Carini, 2002; Betts, 1996) .
Teacher pay schedule
How do unions impact on pay? We attempt to answer this question by examining the teacher pay schedule. All employers with more than 10 workers in India have to de jure abide by minimum wage laws and 'recognized' private schools are required to pay teachers salaries on a par with the government teacher salary scales. De facto, many private schools pay teachers significantly less than the government prescribed minima. For instance, at the middle school level, Kingdon (1996) found that private teachers' mean salary was only 60% of the public teachers' mean salary. Kingdon and Teal (2006) confirm that salary structures in public and private schools in India are very different.
The survey for this study collected information on all teachers that taught grade 10 students in sample schools. This yielded a sample of 2103 teachers of whom 1731 are teachers of the five compulsory subjects taught at grade 10 level. The first column of Table 5 presents an OLS equation of log of teacher pay but our data also have within-school variation in teacher pay, which is used to estimate a school fixed effects equation in column 2. The coefficients on some of the variables -and especially on the union membership variable -change when moving from across to within school estimation. Since teachers may sort into schools on the basis of their unobserved characteristics, we rely more on the school fixed effects regression in the second column.
The variable of interest is union membership. It is seen that the coefficient on union membership is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Within a school, a union member earns a wage premium of 14.9% over non-union members. This regression does not control for the teacher characteristics identified above as potentially determined by unionization.
If we include these, the union effect falls to 9.5% as is shown in Table 6 . This is similar to the union wage effect of 7.6% estimated by Lemke (2004) for Pennsylvania using data from school districts after accounting for aspects of teacher quality. It is also virtually identical to the union wage effect of 8-10% associated with other US public sector unions.
Applying a similar test for the importance of unobservables to those already reported for the achievement equation we do now find a positive potential bias on the positive union coefficient, but it is small compared with the size of the union pay effect. The ratio of effect to bias is 1.65 which implies that the role of unobservables that determine pay would have to be more than 1.65 times the role of observables for the entire union pay effect to be explained away by the unobservables, which seems unlikely. This suggests that part of the union pay effect is real.
Conclusions
Using a methodology for identification that allows for controls at the level of the pupil, we find that the achievement level of a student in a subject that is taught by a unionized teacher is about a quarter of a standard deviation lower than his/her achievement in a subject that is taught by a nonunionized teacher. A school fixed effects equation of teacher pay shows that union membership is rewarded with substantially higher pay.
While we controlled for what are commonly regarded as the most important sources of omitted variable bias in the student achievement equation -namely the non-random matching of students to schools and teachers on the basis of their unobserved characteristics, teacher unobservables are still in the error term and could be related with observed teacher characteristics.
We have sought to deal with this potential source of bias by using the method of Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) and find, once we allow for school or student fixed effects, that the negative union effect on student achievement is, if anything, underestimated. For the teacher pay equation we find, using a similar method, that it is very unlikely that the positive effect of union on pay can be explained away by bias due to unobservables.
In summary union membership reduces achievement and raises costs in private schools in India.
Lemke, R. (2004) Note: Descriptive statistics of standardized mark by subject are not reported as, by construction, the mean of standardized mark is 0 and standard deviation is 1 for each subject. Estimated Bias (Equation (8)) 0.57 0.27 0.91 Ratio (a) 0.31 ----(a) This is the ratio of the coefficient on union membership and the estimated bias. Note: Constant included but not shown. Standard errors were corrected for clustering of errors between subjects within a pupil, i.e. we have used pupil id as the clustering variable. In all three columns, the fixed effects (state, school and pupil respectively) were highly statistically significant in F-tests (not shown). ** represents statistical significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level. (a) This is the ratio of the coefficient on union membership and the estimated bias.
Note: Constant included but not shown. Standard errors were corrected for clustering of errors between subjects within a pupil, i.e. we have used pupil id as the clustering variable. In all three columns, the fixed effects (state, school and pupil respectively) are highly statistically significant in F-tests. ** represents statistical significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level Four subject combinations English, second language, history-geography, math -0.2569** -5.59 English, second language, history-geography, science -0.2566** -6.94 English, history-geography, math, science -0.1049** -2.74 English, second language, math, science -0.2006** -6.04 Second language, history-geography, math, science -0.3431** -8.47
Notes: All equations estimated using the pupil fixed effects estimator and using the exact specification of column 3 in the bottom panel (panel B) of Table 2 , i.e. including controls for teacher variables. ** represents statistical significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level. (a) This is the ratio of the coefficient on union membership and the estimated bias. Table 6 Regression of log of teacher's monthly pay (including the teacher characteristics in TC') (Teachers of grade 10 who teach the 5 main subjects only) (a) This is the ratio of the coefficient on union membership and the estimated bias. Note: t-values are in parentheses and are robust to clustering at the school level. For School fixed-effects estimation, the number of groups is 183, i.e. estimation is within 183 schools. Mean number of teachers within a school is 9.5 (minimum=4, maximum=30). The F-test shows that the school dummies are jointly significant at the 0.000 level. Constant included but not shown. ** represents statistical significance at the 1% level and * at the 5% level. 
